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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
“In democratic countries the science of association is the mother of
science; the progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has
made. Amongst the laws which rule human societies there is one which
seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain
civilized, or to become so, the art of associating together must grow
and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is
increased.”
- Tocqueville, Democracy In America (1835)
The people with whom we choose to form relationships influence our
behavior, beliefs, and decisions directly and indirectly. The effects of social
interactions on most economic activities are well documented in economic
literature and are particularly valuable in low-income economies where
institutions for formal insurance and contract enforcement are weak. This
suggests that programs facilitating regular interaction among its members
might be an effective tool for development policy. In 1958, Edward C. Banfield
wrote in “The Moral Basis of Backward Society” that social capital “is a very
important limiting factor in the way of economic development in most of the
world.” Modern economic theory has, since then, evolved to account for the
deadweight loss generated by the lack of social capital, or trust, during all
contractual economic activities.
Recent research has focused on identifying factors that determine the
formation and evolution of social interactions. A particular area of interest
in economics is the study of informal financial groups in rural developing
economies and its impact on the members and the society at large. But can
simply encouraging people to join groups induce their overall social capital?
Using data from a recent savings groups field experiment in Uganda, I attempt
to quantify the evolution of social interactions within the savings groups, with
particular focus on the marginalized members of the community.
The experiment in Uganda is designed to evaluate the impact of including
the most marginalized members of the community in Village Savings and
Loan Associations (VSLAs). It is unusual for the most marginalized members
to be part of the savings groups. The marginalized participants enrolled in
these savings groups are also the most vulnerable by socio-economic measures.
They have significantly lower income per capita, lower access to savings
groups and formal bank accounts, higher failure rate of providing food to their
families, and lower access to safe drinking water and latrine. Vulnerable and
Non-vulnerable participants are clearly separated using a index created from
the above measures. It is unclear why the vulnerable members usually do not
join, but it seems they usually lack the connections and the resources to join
the group. The rich members in the rural communities rarely join VSLAs
because they have access to formal institutions such as banks and microfinance;
hence, it is usually the case that the ’middle-income’ forms the majority of the
participants in VSLAs. However, the focus of this experiment is to include the
most vulnerable members of the community.
VSLAs are non-market, self-managed, financial groups with increasing
popularity in developing countries. A particular VSLA has about 20-30
members, living in close proximity, who meet on a weekly basis and are able
to save and borrow in a structured way. Since members of the savings group
borrow and lend from each other, trust and cooperation is crucial for the
smooth functioning of these groups. According to a recent survey conducted by
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VSL Associates, there are 6.12 million active participants worldwide, with 90%
of its participants in Africa.1 I provide detailed explanation of the experiment
and how the VSLAs operate in chapter II.
There is a significant growth in economic literature that focuses on the
provision of formal and informal financial services to poor households in
developing economies. Rural developing economies constantly face an imbalance
between the abundance of risk and a lack of resources to mitigate those risks.
These risks come in form of illness, unfavorable weather, or a sudden need to
finance an investment opportunity. Udry (1994) argued that stabilization of
consumption in the face of fluctuating income is one of the primary reasons
for the poor to borrow from formal and informal financial institutions. These
institutions allow them to save for future needs, insure against erratic shocks,
and invest in health, education, and income generating activities.
For my thesis, I use the partial VSLA data from a survey conducted for
over 3000 respondents in rural Uganda. I combine the full data collected in
2013 to the partial data which is still under collection. This is a comprehensive
data that captures the socio-economic status of the households throughout the
study. A significant portion of this data set contains rich information about
their social interactions and I create additional indices, which collectively
capture a individual’s social interaction. I use this data to explain the evolving
social interactions within and among the savings groups.
My results suggest that involvement in savings groups has positive impact
on social interactions for all participants and particularly significant increase
is seen among non-vulnerable participants. Savings group membership yield
1Data retrieved November 6, 2014 from http://www.vsla.net/
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higher social capital among participants who are relatively better-off. It is
a widely held belief that higher social interactions contributes to trust and
reciprocity, and consequently cooperation. These findings substantiate the claim
that interaction in a group activity possibly yield economically valuable social
capital. It allows policy makers and development agencies to consider important
non-financial benefits of informal savings groups. As the current debate on
financial inclusion for the poor evolves over time, the findings of this study will
be valuable for resource allocations and design.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
Background
In 2008, World Bank estimated that 2.47 billion people lived on less than
two dollars per day. Among the 2.47 billion, the poorest 1.29 billion - 22% of
the world’s population - lives on less than $1.25 a day. 1 It is important to
note that with such meagre incomes, access to financial tools become a crucial
resource for livelihood. Note that earning $2 per day does not mean that their
fixed salary is $2 per day. These individuals are usually self-employed and their
incomes are highly erratic. With this budget in mind, a typical household
head strives to ensure that they have sufficient food for their family, plan for
unforeseen emergencies, save for big-ticket items such as furniture, education,
funeral, and marriage. The ability to manage money well might not appear to
be more important than being healthy or well educated, but it is fundamental
to achieving these broader goals. Understanding these relationships has
motivated development researchers to find financial innovations that work
and to determine why they work in rural developing economies. Collins et al.
(2010) argue in their recent book that “money management is, for the poor, a
fundamental and well-understood part of everyday life.” They are constantly
looking for ways to make two dollars work in order to ensure there is enough
food for dinner and also cover all other expenditures that life puts in their way.
1Data retrieved October 20, 2014 from http://go.worldbank.org/4K0EJIDFA0
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Members of developed economies are equipped with sophisticated financial
market institutions, such as commercial banks, credit unions, and insurance
companies, which offer a myriad of services that allow them to live better lives.
They make it easier for people to take out loans for education, real estate,
innovative business ideas, health emergencies, etc. These market institutions
fail in rural developing economies mostly because of information and
enforcement problems. Without proper infrastructure, it is extremely difficult
for these institutions to access enough informations such as credit history and
equally little faith in the ability to seize collateral, resulting in frequent loan
defaults. In addition, for formal institutions based in urban areas, the delivery
costs for extending their services to the rural poor are extremely high.
As a consequence, informal savings groups, such as VSLAs, have served
as a popular non-market institutions and has been rapidly growing in rural
developing economies for the last two decades, primarily because of their
sustainable nature. VSLA is a group-based, self-financed, savings group where
members save and request loans from those savings. The purpose of a VSLA is
to provide savings and loan facilities in areas that are not served by financial
institutions. VSLAs have been introduced in 61 countries and have reached 6.12
million active participants worldwide. According to SAVIX, over 90% of the
groups continue to operate more than five years after they received training.2
Each group is composed of 20-30 individuals and they hold weekly
meetings to carry out their operations. At each meeting members can save
by purchasing shares. The amount of each share is set by the group and all
purchases are recorded in a logbook. The members can purchase up to five
2Data retrieved November 6, 2014 from http://savingsgroups.com/
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shares at a particular meeting. The activity of the groups run in cycles of
one year and the share price is set by the group at the beginning of the cycle.
Participants independently decide how much they wish to contribute, and
all the contributions are kept in a locked box. There is no minimum savings
requirement. Each lock box has three padlocks and the keys are held by three
members of the group. As the amount saved in the box grows over time,
participants can request to borrow a portion of it, under condition that the
loan is repaid with interest. Loans are for a maximum period of three months.
At the end of a cycle, the total sum in the pot is redistributed back to the
members, each obtaining a share that is proportional to the amount they
deposited during the cycle; following the distribution, a new cycle starts.
As the new cycle begins, members who do not wish to continue may leave
the group and new members may be invited. Members who continue on to the
next cycle can use their shared-out amount to make contributions to the loan
fund of the next cycle. Before the next cycle begins, members review the rules
and make changes as they see necessary.
VSLAs provide both a source of interest-bearing savings and credit to
the rural poor, a population that generally has access to neither. Generally,
VSLAs are initiated by local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): there
are significant fixed costs that a group incurs, such as the stationary required
to keep accounts and the large, metal box where the savings are kept, and
often the group requires intensive training on the method. Once they are set
up, VSLAs can be autonomously run solely by the members. Research shows
positive benefits to financial inclusion through savings groups, as members build
savings and are better equipped to improve the security of their household,
7
tackle unexpected shocks such as thefts, sickness, and death in the household.
Traditional community methods of saving, such as the ROtating Savings and
Credit Associations called ROSCAs, can provide an opportunity to save, but
it does not allow them to earn interest on their deposits as a formal account
would. Whereas, VSLAs allow group members to save and borrow while, at the
same time, earn interest on their savings.
Literature Review
Literature in economics discussing financial services in developing
countries is available in abundance. Townsend (1994) and Udry (1994)
present evidence, from rural India and Nigeria respectively, that in the void
of formal market institutions, non-market promote risk sharing in developing
economies. Evidence suggests that, among developing countries, only about
7% of household borrowing occurs through formal institutions, majority of
the transaction is between friends and relatives living in the same or adjacent
villages (Fafchamps, 2003). Karlan et. al (2014) present evidence that only 22%
of adults worldwide report saving at a formal financial institutions in the past
12 months, and approximately 77% adults living on less than $2 per day report
not having a savings account at a formal institution. Karlan et. al (2009) argue
that the possibility of losing valuable friendships secures informal transactions
the same way that the possibility of losing physical collateral can secure formal
lending. Since formal market institutions fail to perform perfectly, non-market
institutions exist in large numbers around the world in developing economies.
Non-market institutions harness the power of social ties to reduce information
and enforcement problems.
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Banerjee et. al. (2009) presented evidence that impact of financial
inclusion was positive and significant, particularly among owners of pre-existing
businesses and composition of household expenditure among urban poor in
India. However the impact of inclusion was mostly limited to already-profitable
businesses. There are numerous studies that provide evidence for the benefits of
VSLAs to the poor. Ksoll et al. (2013) is one such study that demonstrates
significant improvements in food security, increased savings, and other economic
activities. Beaman et. al. (2013) suggest that participation in VSLAs improve
food security and consumption variability in Mali. However, they find no
evidence to suggest improvements in health or education.
There is also a growing evidence that suggests association between savings
groups and social capital. Karlan, Ratan, and Zinman (2014), focusing on
demand side constraints, argue that undersaving, which can lead to important
welfare consequences, is mainly caused by constraints that include lack of
trust and social constraints. They argue that undersaving can have important
welfare consequences such as variable consumption, low resilience to shocks,
and forgone profitable investments. The authors further argue that low social
capital is a primary reason for low trust among the consumers of financial
services. The lack of randomized field evaluations on the lack of trust is due to
the difficulty in randomly assigning trust. In addition, Besley and Coate (1995)
provides theoretical arguments for how micro finance can exploit social capital
within communities to increase the viability of lending to the poor.
Membership in an informal savings group requires regular meetings for
the members which has plausible influence on their social capital through their
interactions. There is growing research on the impact of group involvement,
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specifically among savings groups, on social capital. There exists a wide range
of evidence that social capital contributes to the economic development, yet
little is understood about how social capital is generated. An important reason
for this is the endogenous nature of the social ties.
A body of literature also focuses on the interdependence between informal
savings groups and social capital. For example, Comola and Silvia (2013) show
that an exogenous intervention, an expansion in formal financial access, affects
structure of the pre-existing network of informal financial transaction. In
addition, they also propose a peer-effect estimation framework on household
income. Kinnan and Townsend (2012) argue that, since the intra-village loan
tends to be large and infrequent, consumption smoothing is higher if households
have either, direct or indirect, financial network. Investment smoothing for
larger amounts are higher if households have better kinship network in that
particular village. Conley and Udry (2010) use unique communication patterns
data in Ghana to estimate each individual’s information neighborhood. They
find evidence that farmers “adjust their inputs to align with those of their
information neighbors who were surprisingly successful in previous periods”. In
addition to the importance of social capital in developing countries, Guiso et. al.
(2004), exploiting the social capital differences in Italy, demonstrate that effect
of social capital is strong where institutions for social contracts are weak.
The arguments made in this thesis are closest to a recent paper by Field
et. al (2013), which uses experimental variation in group meeting frequency
to show that meeting more frequently builds social capital among female
micro finance clients in India. The authors are able to show that development
programs that aim to cultivate social capital among women can have a strong
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affect on the group cohesion well beyond the extent of the actual program. The
authors construct a Social Contact Index to estimate the average effect size
based on responses to the following four survey questions: (1) How many group
members have you visited in their houses in the last two weeks?, (2) How many
group members have visited you in your house in the last two weeks?, (3) How
many people in the group did you talk to about business matters in the last two
weeks?, and (4) How many people in the group did you talk to about personal
matters in the last two weeks?.
In the following sections, I present evidence that inclusion in savings
groups has positive and significant impact on group cohesion and social
interactions particularly among the non-vulnerable members of the society.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND ESTIMATION
Project Overview
This research project is a collaboration between four NGOs based in
Uganda: AVSI, CARE, TPO, and FHI 360. It is focused on providing financial
services to the vulnerable households in rural Uganda.1 The four NGOs
collaborate on a much larger project, SCORE (Sustainable COmprehensive
REsponses for vulnerable children and their families), which provides many
services to 125,000 vulnerable children and their household in 35 districts
across Uganda. Project SCORE was launched in fall of 2011 with a USD
9 million USAID grant. SCORE focuses their resources on improving the
lives of the children and hence provides services in four main areas: economic
strengthening, nutrition, child protection, and family strengthening.
SCORE is dedicated to provide interventions that build capacity in
a sustainable manner among household rather than direct service delivery.
Inclusion into the program required households to meet a vulnerability
threshold which then allows members of the selected households to enroll in a
number of programs, including classes on advanced farming techniques, cooking,
nutrition, business training, business development, and an opportunity to
participate in SCORE VSLAs. These VSLAs were formed by first enrolling
project SCORE beneficiaries and then opening the membership to other
1Vulnerable participants have significantly lower income per capita, lower access to savings
groups and formal bank accounts, higher failure rate of providing food to their families, and
lower access to safe drinking water and latrine. Vulnerable and Non-vulnerable participants
are clearly separated using a index created from the above measures.
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community households. SCORE requires that at least 50% participants to be
their beneficiaries. This rule makes SCORE VSLAs unique from other forms of
informal savings groups in that there is a intentional effort to be inclusive of
vulnerable and marginal households of rural areas.
Alfredo Burlando, Assistant Professor of Economics at University of
Oregon, and Andrea Canidio, Assistant Professor of Economics at Central
European University, are the Principal Investigators (PIs) of this project and
their research seeks to evaluate the impact of randomly assigning varying
composition of vulnerable participants in a SCORE VSLA. They work
closely with all SCORE partners and primarily with FHI 360, a monitoring
and evaluation agency, to conduct field activities. In January 2013, the
PIs partnered with SCORE, as they were continuing their expansion in 90
previously unserved villages in Uganda. Among the SCORE vulnerable
participants who showed interest in joining a VSLA, the PIs randomly chose 14
in each village to be part of the study. The PIs randomly assigned 60 villages
to a dense treatment and remaining 30 villages to a sparse treatment. In
each dense treatment village, the 14 pre-selected vulnerable participants were
assigned to a VSLA along with 14 self-selected members from the same village,
who were not required to meet the vulnerability threshold and were not part
of SCORE. In each sparse treatment village, the 14 pre-selected vulnerable
participants were divided into two VSLAs, each with 7 vulnerable participants
and 21 self-selected members from the same village. In total, there were 120
VSLAs - 60 dense and 60 sparse - and each village was either sparse or dense to
minimize spillover effects of the intervention. Figure 1 illustrates the difference
in treatment between sparse and dense villages.
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Pre-selected participants (program beneficiaries) 
 
1 “Dense” group  2 “Sparse” groups  
Self-selected 
participants 
(from the 
community) 
FIGURE 1. Treatment Figure
Identification of vulnerable participants was central to the exogenous
intervention for this field experiment. In order to identify these participants,
all households were asked questions that reflected their socio-economic status
and well-being of the household and their children. Based on their responses,
each respondent was assigned a vulnerability index. If a household scored above
a threshold of 40, they were categorized as vulnerable and were eligible to
participate in SCORE.
After the groups were formed, it was essential to check whether the
experiment did what it was supposed to do. Following another wave of data
collection, the results indicated that approximately 26% of the sparse groups
and 52% of the dense groups were composed of vulnerable participants, as
illustrated in Figure 2. For the rest of this paper, I will refer to the SCORE
households that scored above the vulnerability threshold as direct beneficiaries
and households from the community that self-selected into SCORE VSLAs as
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indirect beneficiaries, as they are participating in a SCORE VSLA but are
ineligible to receive other benefits.
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FIGURE 2. Fraction of beneficiaries in the two VSLAs
Data
Administrative Data: SCORE field officers periodically collect
administrative data which contains operational information about all the
VSLAs. These include, but are not limited to, interest rate, amount saved by
each member, minimum and maximum saving allowed by each group and length
of the borrowing cycle etc.
Baseline and Endline: Baseline and Endline surveys are comprehensive
surveys that captures detailed socio-economic characteristics of the household,
income generating activities, consumption behavior, asset ownership, the
individual’s personal experience as a VSLA member, information on their social
capital and informal lending and borrowing. Baseline surveys were administered
few months following the formation of savings groups.
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Social Capital Data: A section of baseline and endline surveys, given
out to all the participants, focused on their social connections status. I use four
social connection variables from the survey: participants were asked if they met
someone in their group during free time, if the sought advice from someone
in their group, if someone from their group sought advice from them, and if
they were involved in other social groups. The data also captures the unique
personal identification code of the people they interact with, however for the
purposes of this paper I will use social capital variables as dummies. Dummy
variables is used in econometrics to analyze qualitative data. In this case,
dummy variables take the value 0 or 1 to indicate if their response was ‘yes’ or
‘no’ to a particular question. It is an artificial variable created to represent an
attribute with two or more distinct categories. These dummy variables are used
in regression analysis to capture the effect of their response on the outcome
variable, or treat it as an outcome variable.
In order to better capture the change in social interactions, I create three
different indices using the four social connections variables available in the data.
The first was calculated using a z-score of the four variables, second index was
a dummy which was 1 if the respondent answered ‘yes’ for at least one of the
four questions, and the third index was created using the principal component
analysis. Principal Component Analysis (pca) is a statistical method that gives
us more information about the principal components and structure of the data.
Refer to Tables 1, 2, and 3 for summary statistics of all the relevant variables
that I use in this paper.
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Estimation
I used fixed-effects estimation model to measure the impact of social
interaction among beneficiaries.
Fixed effects model allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity among entities. In this case, the implementing partners (IPs) are
different in how they conduct trainings when creating a certain VSLA. Each
consortium partner - or the collaborating NGOs - work with local partners who
implement the formation of VSLAs and regulate administrative data collection
on the ground. These local implementing partners are equipped with varying
resources and are working with VSLAs in different geographies. However, using
a fixed-effects model we can still compare VSLAs formed by different IPs in a
way that is not biased by omitted variables that account for these differences.
The fixed-effects method controls for these entity level heterogeneities by
leaving them out of the estimation.
I estimate the effects of vulnerability and group composition on social
interaction using the following fixed-effects specification for IP j and clustered
by parish:
SocialInteractioni = β1Beneficiaryi +
23∑
j=1
β2j × ρ { ρ=1 if ip=j} + εi (3.1)
SocialInteractioni = β1Densei +
23∑
j=1
β2j × ρ { ρ=1 if ip=j} + εi (3.2)
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SocialInteractioni = β1Beneficiaryi + β2Endlinei
+ β3(Beneficiary × Endline)i +
23∑
j=1
β4j × ρ { ρ=1 if ip=j} + εi (3.3)
Estimation (3.3) specification uses panel estimates to look at vulnerable
and non-vulnerable participants at endline. Panel estimates were constructed
by setting-up each observation twice; at baseline and endline. Coefficient β2
is of particular interest in estimation (3.3) as it estimates the coefficients for
non-vulnerable participants at endline.
In all the regression tables, each coefficient estimate is accompanied by
a robust standard error (clustered by parish); the number of observations in
the estimation sample; and a goodness of fit measure (R2). In addition, for all
the regression tables where key coefficients are summarized, they include a
implementing partner (IP) fixed effects. Therefore, all regression tables display
abbreviated results, where fixed effects are suppressed. Note the number of
observations vary for the social capital, social capital index regressions. This is
due to the sub-sample data where I have access to only 1,484 observations.
Results
The results I present in the body of this thesis are from two data sets:
first was collected in 2013 between August and November and the second comes
from the subsample of the collection that began in August 2014, and is still in
process, which is matched with the first dataset.
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Vulnerability
In Tables 4, 5, and 6, differences between the direct and indirect
beneficiaries are displayed using the economic and livelihood status indicators:
income per capita in Ugandan Shillings (UGX), land owned in acres, access to
savings account, involvement in other savings groups, currently have a bank
loan, disability rates at home, household size, failure to provide food, access to
safe drinking water, and access to latrine. These indicators were selected by the
PIs and together these metrics are used to determine the vulnerability index of
the beneficiaries.
Note that all regressions are accompanied by robust standard errors and
fixed effects for implementing partners (IPs).
Table 6 estimates the regression coefficients for the economic and
livelihood status among direct and indirect beneficiaries. The most clear results
in Table 6 are for income per capita, involvement in other savings groups,
currently have a bank loan, failure to provide food at the end of the day, and
access to safe drinking water and latrine. The coefficient estimates associated
with these events are significantly different from zero. The results indicate
that beneficiaries are approximately 25.5% less likely to be a part of another
savings group, 3.26% less likely to have a bank loan, 19.5 % more likely to go
without food, 7.7 % more likely to have access to safe drinking water, 11.7%
less likely to have access to latrine, and on average beneficiaries’ income per
capita is 2,230 less than indirect beneficiaries in Ugandan Shillings. From the
above indicators, it is clear that, initially, direct and indirect beneficiaries are
significantly different in most metrics of vulnerability.
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Similarly, Tables 7 and 9 are regression tables where the same fixed effects
and robust standard errors follow. These regression estimate the coefficients for
social capital indicators and the specified social capital indices, respectively,
using the subsample from endline. The most unambiguous results in Table 7 are
for visitation during free time, seeking advice, giving advice, and involvement
in social groups; all coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero
at baseline and endline, except for social groups, which is only significant at
baseline. The results indicate that, at baseline, the beneficiaries are 19.1%
more likely to meet someone during their free time, 25.7% more likely to seek
advice from someone, 21.4% more likely to give advice to someone, 2.9% less
likely to be involved in other social groups. At endline, the beneficiaries are
7.3% less likely to meet someone during their free time, 5.5% less likely to seek
advice, and 5.6% less likely to give advice to someone. Note that most endline
coefficient estimates are weakly significant and negative. However, there is a
significant change in the variable “other social groups”, which indicates that,
relative to non-beneficiaries, beneficiaries are 10.2% more likely to be involved
in other social groups.
The results in Table 9 are additional metrics that were created to
collectively measure social capital and cohesion between direct and indirect
beneficiaries. I estimated coefficients for three different social indices at baseline
and endline and the results in Table 9 indicate that all but z score index at
endline are significantly different from zero. The results imply that, at baseline,
beneficiaries are 0.427 standard deviations higher than non-beneficiaries, 4.6
% more likely to answer yes for at least one of the social capital questions in
Table 7, and have 0.783 higher principal component analysis (pca) index. At
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endline, beneficiaries are 4.6 % less likely to answer yes for at least one of the
social capital questions in Table 7 and they have 0.237 lower pca index. The
results from Table 7 and 9 indicate that beneficiaries are initially more likely
to have significantly higher social connections within the group, however the
difference is less significant at endline. A plausible reason might be that indirect
beneficiaries have much higher social connections at endline. Note in Table 9,
both, z score and pca social indices are less significant than their corresponding
measures at baseline.
The results in Tables 10 and 11 further investigate the differences
between direct and indirect beneficiaries. In addition to IP fixed effects and
robust standard errors, Table 10 also includes a dummy interaction between
the variables endline and beneficiary. Note that coefficient estimates for the
variable endline is the average change for indirect beneficiaries at endline. At
endline, indirect beneficiaries are 31.2 % more likely to visit someone during
their free time, 48.8% more likely to seek advice and 40.9% more likely to give
advice to someone. However, beneficiaries are 11.4% more likely to be involved
in other social groups at endline. At endline, indirect beneficiaries are 0.883
standard deviations higher in z-score index, 1.427 points higher according to
pica index, and 2.3% more likely to answer yes to at least one of four social
connection questions, all results are significantly different from zero.
Most results remain similar and significant in Table 11 where individual
fixed effects are included, instead of IP fixed effects. According to Table 11, at
endline, indirect beneficiaries are 31.2 % more likely to visit someone during
their free time, 48.8% more likely to seek advice and 40.9% more likely to give
advice to someone. Beneficiaries are still 11.4% more likely to be a part of
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other social groups. At endline, indirect beneficiaries also score 0.883 standard
deviations higher in z-score index, 23.1% more likely to answer yes to at least
one of four questions, and have 1.427 points higher pca index.
Dense
In Table 14, differences between the dense and sparse VSLAs are
displayed using the same economic and livelihood indicators used above. Note
that dense VSLAs have, on average, 50 % higher composition of vulnerable
participants than sparse VSLAs. Table 14 estimates the regression coefficients
for the economic and livelihood status among dense and sparse VSLAs. Among
the dense and sparse groups, the most clear results are for acres of land owned,
failure to provide food, and access to safe water. Participants in the dense
VSLAs are likely to own 59.2 % more land, 6.9% more likely to go without
food, and have 13 % more likely to have access to safe drinking water. Other
estimates are not significantly different from zero. From the results, it seems
that dense and sparse VSLAs look alike. Note that participants in the dense
VSLA are more likely to go without food, but other variables are similar.
The results in Tables 12 and 13 are regression tables that estimate the
coefficients for social capital indicators and the specified social capital indices,
respectively, using the subsample from endline. Among all variables for social
capital and social capital index, involvement in other social groups - at endline -
is the only variable that is significantly different from zero. The overall social
capital measures seem very alike between dense and sparse groups.
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CHAPTER IV
CAVEATS AND CONCLUSIONS
Caveats and Future Research
The results of my study could improve if I had access to the entire endline
data. The activities are currently ongoing and are anticipated to be available
towards the end of this year. I have used approximately half of the endline data
for my thesis purposes and with the entire data, some results could change.
With more time, I would have manipulated the available data to include
the individual characteristics of each person in the network and document the
pattern of social connections. This way one could easily see if social capital is
being created across socio-economic characteristics. I would also be interested
to document changes in the financial behavior as a result of their social
networks. Perhaps these data would allow me to make further inferences about
the evolution of social network quality and its impact on socio-economic and
financial outcomes.
Conclusions
This thesis applies econometric methods to estimate the evolution of
social networks among individuals of varying socio-economic backgrounds
participating in Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs). It provides
empirical support to the idea that group involvement creates economically
valuable social capital. The fundamental results of my research suggest that, at
least initially, vulnerable participants have higher social capital compared to
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their counterparts. However, over time, change in social capital is much higher
for non-vulnerable participants. These results support the hypothesis that
group activities positively contribute to social interactions, and consequently to
efficient economic transactions.
It is important to note that overall change among vulnerable participants
is low. This might be due to their initial low socio-economic status which
potentially prevented them from creating new networks with non-vulnerable
participants. Relative to the vulnerable participants, social capital is low among
non-vulnerable participants at baseline, and significant increase at endline
suggests that they are interacting within the group at a much higher rate. Note
that non-vulnerable participants are significantly different, socio-economically,
from vulnerable participants and they self-selected themselves into these savings
groups. These factors might be an indication that non-vulnerable participants
are inherently more sociable than the vulnerable participants.
Another interesting finding is that, over time, involvement in other social
groups, among vulnerable participants, increases drastically. This could be an
indication that vulnerable participants are developing social skills during their
VSLA membership. This provides evidence that development programs that are
designed to facilitate repeated interactions among its members can enhance
social capital, sociability, and therefore meaningful economic interactions.
The key results of my analysis align with previous results in the literature
[e.g. Fields et. al. (2013) and Comola and Silvia (2013)]. These authors suggest
that meeting frequency and financial inclusion, respectively, affect social
interactions among its members.
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The evidence from my paper demonstrates that VSLA activities affect
social networks among some groups considerably, which imply that group-based
activities may have a substantial impact on social networks. To the extent that
VSLA activities might be important tools of further risk-sharing, cooperation
and information diffusion. An important objective of future research would be
to understand how development programs and policies can be designed to
improve the social infrastructure of poor communities.
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Tables
TABLE 1. Summary statistics: full sample at baseline(N = 3, 899)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. t-stat
Number of Neighbors 1.37 2.7 5.09
Number of Relatives 2.236 2.39 2.17
Visit during free time 0.457 0.498 -12.96
Seek Advice 0.338 0.473 -14.31
Give Advice 0.302 0.459 -10.68
Social Groups 0.347 0.476 5.87
Social Index z-score 0.003 1.005 -11.00
Social Index at least 1 0.624 0.484 -5.37
TABLE 2. Summary statistics: sub sample at endline (N = 1, 484)
Baseline Endline
Variable Mean Std. Dev. t-stat Mean Std. Dev. t-stat
Number of Neighbors 2.3 2.17 6.67 2.3 2.08 -3.71
Number of Relatives 1.31 2.65 2.39 1.51 2.6 -0.09
Visit during free time 0.57 0.495 -7.64 0.78 0.41 3.74
Seek Advice 0.42 0.494 -10.13 0.79 0.41 2.54
Give Advice 0.396 0.489 -8.81 0.70 0.46 2.42
Social Groups 0.482 0.50 6.77 0.53 0.49 2.45
Social Index z-score 0.0002 1 -1.42 0.008 0.99 -2.4
Social Index at least 1 0.813 0.39 0 0.93 0.25 0
Social Index pca 4e−09 1.45 -1.67 -1.6e−08 1.46 -3.2
t-statistic: differences among beneficiaries
TABLE 3. Summary statistics: Combined Indices (N = 2, 462)
Baseline Endline
Variable Mean Std. Dev. t-stat Mean Std. Dev. t-stat
Social Index z-score -0.374 0.966 4.03 0.369 0.891 -4.88
Social Index at least 1 0.799 0.4 3.39 0.935 0.25 0.72
Social Index pca -0.584 1.45 3.8 0.584 1.26 -7.22
t-statistic: differences among beneficiaries
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TABLE 4. Direct and Indirect beneficiaries: Economic indicators
Characteristic Direct Indirect Difference Significance
Income per capital (UGX) 8540 11,051 2,300 UGX lower Yes
Land owned (acres) 2.54 1.86 0.54 higher Yes
Has savings account 6.0% 9.5% 3.3% lower Yes
Other savings groups 18.5% 24.6% 4.6% lower Yes
Had a bank loan 2.8% 4.6% 1.8% lower Yes
TABLE 5. Direct and Indirect beneficiaries: Livelihood status indicators
Characteristic Direct Indirect Difference Significance
Disability rates at home 40% 29% 9.3% higher Yes
Household size 6.4 6.5 0.1 higher No
Sometimes goes without food 69.2% 49.4% 19.4 % higher Yes
Access to safe water 67.7% 61.8% 7.8 % higher Yes
Access to latrine 77.3% 90% 11.7% higher Yes
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APPENDIX
ECONOMETRIC METHOD: FIXED EFFECTS
A detailed and rigorous discussion of econometrics is beyond the scope
of this thesis, however this appendix discusses the intuition behind why the
fixed-effects model are used in this research.
Fixed effects model allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity among entities. In this case, the implementing partners (IPs) are
different in how they conduct trainings when creating a certain VSLA. Each
consortium partner - or the collaborating NGOs - work with local partners who
implement the formation of VSLAs and regulate administrative data collection
on the ground. These local implementing partners are equipped with varying
resources and are working with VSLAs in different geographies. However, using
a fixed-effects model we can still compare VSLAs formed by different IPs in a
way that is not biased by omitted variables that account for these differences.
The fixed-effects method controls for these entity level heterogeneities by
leaving them out of the estimation. The mathematical interpretation follows:
Yi = β1Xi + β2
23∑
j=1
d× i{ i=1 if ip=j} + εi
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